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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT-MOTOR VEHICLE
CODE-VOID-FOR-VAGUENESS

DOCTRINE-STRICT

LIABILITY CRIMES

-The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that, in imposing
criminal liability for driving with a blood alcohol level of 0.10 percent or greater, the legislature did not exceed the latitude afforded
the Commonwealth under its police powers, nor did the statute in
question violate any principles of due process.
Commonwealth v. Mikulan, - Pa.

-

, 470 A.2d 1339 (1983).*

On April 4, 1983, Richard Mikulan (appellee) was arrested by
police officers after his vehicle nearly collided with a Trailways
bus.' A breathalyzer test was administered and chemical analysis
revealed that Mikulan's blood alcohol content by weight (BAC)
was 0.13% .2Mikulan was then charged with driving under the influence of alcohol pursuant to sections
3731(a)(1) and (a)(4) of the
3
Pennsylvania motor vehicle code.
Oral argument was heard by the Court of Common Pleas on July
20, 1983 on appellee's motion to dismiss the information. Judge
Bodley granted the motion and declared section 3731(a)(4) unconstitutional, finding it void for vagueness." The Commonwealth then
filed a direct appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. 5
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed, holding that section
3731(a)(4) was not void for vagueness, and that appellee had failed
to carry his burden of showing that the statute either did not give
* Due to the unavailability of the Mikulan opinion in the Pennsylvania State Reports,
citations to this reporter have been omitted.
1. Commonwealth v. Mikulan, Pa. -,
470 A.2d 1339 (1983). After the collision,
Mikulan and the bus driver were arguing loudly when an approaching policeman detected
alcohol on Mikulan's breath, and observed him stuttering and stumbling. Id. at 1340.
2. Id.
3. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3731 (Purdon 1977). Subsection (a) provides that "[a]
person shall not drive, operate or be in actual physical control of the movement of any
motor vehicle while: (1) under the influence of alcohol to a degree which renders the person
incapable of safe driving ... [or] "(4) the amount of alcohol by weight in the blood of the
person is 0.10% or greater." Id. at § 3731(a)(1). The district justice dismissed the §
3731(a)(1) charge at the preliminary hearing. 470 A.2d at 1340 n.2.
4. Id. at 1340. Judge Bodley, Visiting Senior Judge, Northumberland County, was sitting by special designation in Allegheny County. Id. at 1340 n.3.
5. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 722(7) (Purdon 1975). According to the statute, direct
appeals may be had from orders of courts of common pleas declaring a statute of the Commonwealth invalid as repugnant to the Constitution of the United States or of the Commonwealth. Id.
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a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated
conduct was forbidden, or encouraged arbitrary or erratic
enforcement.
Writing for the court, 7 Justice Larsen noted that there is a
strong presumption of constitutionality for an act of the General
Assembly and a heavy burden of persuasion upon one challenging
that Act on constitutional grounds.8 Citing Snider v. Thornburgha
and Tosto v. Pennsylvania Nursing Home Loan Agency,'0 Justice
Larsen stated that legislation will be declared unconstitutional
only if it "clearly, palpably and visibly" violates the Constitution."
According to Justice Larsen, the exercise of police power is probably the most important function of government, 2 and in preserving public health, safety or welfare, the legislature may limit the
enjoyment of personal liberty and property. 13 He also noted that
6. 470 A.2d at 1339.
7. Justice Zappala joined in the opinion and filed a concurring opinion. Chief Justice
Roberts, Justices McDermott and Nix filed concurring opinions. Justice Hutchinson filed an
opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. Justice Flaherty filed a dissenting
opinion.
8. 470 A.2d at 1340 (citing Snider v. Thornburgh, 496 Pa. 159, 436 A.2d 593 (1981) and
Commonwealth v. Barnes and Tucker Co., 472 Pa. 115, 371 A.2d 461 (1977), appeal dismissed, 434 U.S. 807 (1977)). In Snider, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated that "perhaps the most fundamental principle of statutory construction [is the presumption] ...
that the legislature has acted constitutionally. This presumption 'reflects on the part of the
judiciary the respect due to the legislature as a co-equal branch of government'." 496 Pa. at
166, 436 A.2d at 596 (citing School District of Deer Lakes v. Kane, 463 Pa. 554, 562, 345
A.2d 658, 662 (1975)). In Barnes, the Court declared that "[iut must be recognized that one
who challenges the exercise of the state's police power, affecting a property interest, must
overcome a heavy burden of proof to sustain that challenge." 472 Pa. at 123, 371 A.2d at
465.
9. 496 Pa. 159, 436 A.2d 593 (1981).
10. 460 Pa. 1, 331 A.2d 198 (1975) (a "Court may not declare [a] statute unconstitutional unless it clearly, palpably and plainly violates the Constitution." Id. at 5, 331 A.2d at
199). Writing for the court, Justice Roberts added that "[w]e would be overstepping our
constitutional bounds were we to strike down an act bolstered by such a strong presumption
of constitutionality on the basis of a constitutional provision designed to eliminate an evil
far removed from the public goals of this enlightened legislation." Id. at 16, 331 A.2d at 205.
11. 470 A.2d at 1340.
12. Id.
13. Id. See Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957) which invalidated a registration
provision carrying criminal penalties for failure by a convicted felon to register with the
chief of police if such a felon came into Los Angeles to be or remain for more than five days
or if he lived outside the city but came into it five times or more within a thirty day period.
The provision was held to violate the due process requirement of the fourteenth amendment
for failure to provide notice. Justices Frankfurter, Harlan, and Whitaker dissented, objecting to the majority's reliance upon the distinction between misfeasance and nonfeasance
as an inappropriate principle upon which to test constitutionality. See also Gambone v.
Commonwealth, 375 Pa. 547, 101 A.2d 634 (1954) (statute prohibiting display of liquid fuel
price signs more than twelve inches square was unreasonable, arbitrary, and bore no rational
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the police powers of the Commonwealth are particularly broad
with respect to highway safety and efficiency and that these powers
are perhaps strongest when controlling the sale and consumption
of alcoholic beverages."
Justice Larsen viewed section 3731(a)(4) as a legislative attempt
to curb traffic fatalities and injuries caused by drunk drivers.1 5 He
noted that South Dakota v. Neville'" and other cases cited within
that opinion' 7 recognized the compelling state interest in highway
safety. One legislative solution to the problem of the drunk driver
was to prohibit persons with a BAC of 0.10% or greater from driving, operating, or physically controlling any motor vehicle.' 8 According to Justice Larsen, this solution was rationally and reasonably related to the state's legitimate goal of promoting highway
safety. 9
relation to public health, safety, or morals. Although the legislature may exercise its police
power so as to limit the enjoyment of personal liberty and property to preserve public
health, safety, and morals, the statute in question was not a valid exercise of that power.
This statute was held to be a taking of property without due process of law.).
14. 470 A.2d at 1340-41. See Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1 (1979), where a Massachusetts statute mandating suspension of driver's license for refusal to take a breath analysis test upon arrest for driving while intoxicated and which did not provide for presuspension hearing was held not to violate due process because risk of error is slight and state's
interest in public safety is substantially served by the summary suspension. Justices Stewart, Brennan, Marshall and Stevens dissented because the state failed to provide a prompt
postsuspension hearing, and in their view due process was not satisfied. See also Mauer v.
Boardman, 336 Pa. 17, 7 A.2d 466 (1939), aff'd sub. noma.Mauer v. Hamilton, 309 U.S. 598
(1940) (statute regulating the transport of vehicles by other vehicles on the highway held
not to violate due process; statute was designed to avoid safety hazards resulting from improper weight distribution and impairment of driver's vision); California v. LaRue, 409 U.S.
109 (1972) (under the twenty-first amendment, states have authority to control intoxicating
liquors, and to prohibit certain sexually explicit live entertainment in licensed bars or night
clubs: "[wide latitude as to choice of means to accomplish a permissible end must be accorded to the state agency that is itself the repository of the State's power under the
twenty-first amendment." 409 U.S. at 116 (citing Seagram & Sons v. Hosteller, 384 U.S. 33
(1966)). See also California v. Koczwara, 397 Pa. 575, 155 A.2d 825 (1959) (defendant could
be convicted for the sale of beer to minors by his employees upon his premises without his'
personal knowledge, participation, or presence, but imprisonment under the circumstances
deprived defendant of due process of law.).
15. 470 A.2d at 1341.
16. 103 S. Ct. 916 (1983).
17. See, e.g., Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1 (1979); Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637
(1971); Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971) (Blackmun, J., concurring); Breithaupt v. Abram,
352 U.S. 432 (1957).
18. 470 A.2d at 1341.
19. Id. at 1342. Justice Larsen reached this conclusion after noting that since 1960, the
House of Delegates of the American Medical Association has recognized that a BAC of
0.10% should be accepted as prima facie evidence of intoxication. Id. See Commonwealth v.
DiMarco, slip op. at 12 (C.P. Lycoming County, Sept. 22, 1983).
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Addressing appellee's challenge to the statute under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States
Constitution, Justice Larsen stated that that clause is designed to
protect individuals against arbitrary state action.2" Quoting from
Kolender v. Lawson,21 he stated that the void-for-vagueness doctrine requires a penal statute to define an offense with sufficient
definiteness that an ordinary person can comprehend what conduct
is prohibited and to define that conduct in a manner that does not
encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. 22 At its root,
therefore, the doctrine demands that legislation impose minimal
guidelines to govern law enforcement.2"
Relying upon Grayned v. City of Rockford,24 Justice Larsen indicated that the due process clause does not require legislatures to
spell out with mathematical certainty the standards to which an
individual must conform his conduct.2 5 Instead, the clause requires
only that the statute in question provide reasonable standards to
26
guide prospective conduct.
With this in mind, Justice Larsen rejected the appellee's argument that section 3731(a)(4) was unconstitutionally vague because
a person has no reasonable way of knowing when his blood alcohol
content exceeded 0.10%.27 Justice Larsen asserted that this argument was overly technical and misperceived the nature of the due
process clause and the vagueness doctrine. 28 Justice Larsen inferred that Mikulan was claiming that the Pennsylvania statute in20. 470 A.2d at 1342.
21. 103 S. Ct. 1855 (1983). See infra note 43.
22. 470 A.2d at 1342.
23. Id. According to Justice Larsen, penal statutes without such guidelines would permit "a standardless sweep [that] allows policemen, prosecutors, and juries to pursue their
personal predilections." Id. at 1342-43.
24. 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
25. 470 A.2d at 1343.
26. Id. See Commonwealth v. Heinbaugh, 467 Pa. 1, 354 A.2d 244 (1976) (Pennsylvania statute prohibiting "any lewd act . . . likely to be observed by others who would be
affronted or alarmed" held to be sufficiently definite to uphold conviction of defendant for
masturbating in public).
27. 470 A.2d at 1343. See generally Burg v. People, 144 Cal. App. 3d 169, 192 Cal.
Rptr. 531, 534 (1983) (statute prohibiting driving with BAC of 0.10% or more held not
unconstitutionally vague despite the inability of a person to perceive precisely his own
BAC).
28. 470 A.2d at 1343. This offhand dismissal of an argument that addressed the constitutional sufficiency of the statute is startling, to say the least. One of the "technical" requirements of the modern vagueness test is sufficient notice that one's contemplated conduct is proscribed, especially where criminal penalties are imposed. See California v.
Koczwara, 397 Pa. 575, 155 A.2d 825 (1959). See supra note 14.
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fringed upon constitutionally protected rights. ' 9 He thus concluded
that the appellee's argument was similar to an overbreadth challenge. 30 He rejected such a challenge stating that there is no right
to consume alcohol before driving and that even though a person's
ability to drink before driving and remain within the legal limit
may have been "chilled" by section '3731(a)(4), this was precisely
what the legislature had in mind and was not prohibited by the
due process clause.3 1
Having disposed of the vagueness challenge, Justice Larsen commented that although there was a risk of misjudgment concerning
the lawfulness of one's alcohol consumption, the legislature had
wisely placed that risk on the person who has the choice-the
drinking driver-rather than upon the unwitting victim.32 Justice
Larsen concluded that the inconvenience to the driver was outweighed by the seriousness of the consequences resulting from an
erroneous judgment.33 He determined, therefore, that section
3731(a)(4) must prevail.
In addition to the vagueness challenge, the appellee asserted
29. 470 A.2d at 1344. What the appellee argued, however, is not that the statute infringes or "chills" a constitutionally protected right, but forces him to guess whether his
conduct was permitted or proscribed. Brief for Appellee at 3, Commonwealth v. Mikulan,
470 A.2d 1339 (1983).
30. 470 A.2d at 1344. This conclusion, if correctly drawn, is fatal to appellee's argument because the overbreadth and vagueness doctrines proceed from different premises.
The former, technically, "permits parties in cases involving First Amendment challenges to
government restrictions on noncommercial speech to argue that a regulation is invalid because of its effect on the First Amendment rights of others not presently before the Court."
Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, 455 U.S. 489, 508 (1982) (White, J., concurring). The
latter centers around fair notice of proscribed conduct and prevention of arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Kolender v. Lawson, 103 S. Ct. at 1858 (1983). The effect of confusing these two doctrines is discussed infra notes 84-88 and accompanying text.
Justice White's dissent in Kolender urges that one may not confuse vagueness and overbreadth by attacking the enactment as being vague when applied to conduct other than his
own. But Justice O'Connor pointed out that the Court has traditionally treated vagueness
and overbreadth as logically related doctrines. 103 S. Ct. at 1859 n.8. See, e.g., Keyishan v.,
Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 609 (1967); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
31. 470 A.2d at 1344. Justice Larsen noted that the legislature could prohibit driving
within a reasonable time after the consumption of any amount of alcohol so long as the
prohibition is rationally related to a legitimate legislative purpose. Id. Compare 14 C.F.R. §
91.11 (1984) (Federal Aviation Administration regulations prohibit acting as a crew member
of a civil aircraft within eight hours after consuming any alcoholic beverage).
32. 470 A.2d at 1344. See United States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87, 93 (1975) (statute
prohibiting the mailing of firearms capable of being concealed on the person was not limited
to pistols and revolvers, and was not unconstitutionally vague as applied to defendant's
mailing of a sawed-off shotgun). See supra note 26. See also Nash v. United States, 229 U.S.
373 (1913). See infra note 69.
33. 470 A.2d at 1344.
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that section 3731(a)(4) was unconstitutional because it failed to incorporate a mens rea or criminal culpability requirement.3 4 Justice
Larsen determined that section 3731(a)(4) imposed absolute liability in situations where the sentence was for ninety days or less,3"
but found that such liability was permissible under the circumstances.38 Citing Lambert v. California, Justice Larsen noted that
legislatures need not always include criminal intent as an element
of an offense.3 7 According to the Court, lawmakers have wide latitude to exclude elements of knowledge and diligence from the definition of an offense.38 In Justice Larsen's opinion, the Pennsylvania legislature had not exceeded that latitude when it imposed a
sentence of ninety days or less for violations of section 3731. se He
34. Id. at 1345.
35. Id. at 1347. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 302(c) (Purdon 1983) provides that where
culpability as to a material element is not prescribed by law, if a person acts knowingly or
recklessly with respect thereto, it is sufficient to establish culpability. Id.
Section 305 limits the scope of the culpability requirements outlined in section 302. See
id. at section 304. Section 302 (c) would not apply to summary offenses under § 305(a)(1), or
to "offenses defined by statutes other than [Title 18], in so far as a legislative purpose to
impose absolute liability for such offenses or with respect to any material element thereof
plainly appears" under § 305(a)(2), 18 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 305(a)(1) (Purdon 1983) (emphasis added).
Justice Larsen avoids the application of § 305(a)(1) by interpreting the legislative intent
to impose absolute liability in light of § 305(b)(1), which states that if absolute liability as to
a material element of an offense, or an offense itself is imposed, such offense constitutes a
summary offense. Furthermore, note that where absolute liability is imposed, negligence will
constitute sufficient culpability under § 305(b)(2). 18 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 305(b)(1),
(b)(2) (Purdon 1983).
36. 470 A.2d at 1348.
37. Id. at 1347 (citing Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957)). See United States
v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922) (statute proscribing the sale of certain drugs could be constitutionally applied to defendants who sold such drugs without being aware of their proscribed nature because knowledge was not an element of the offense); Shevlin Carpenter Co.
v. Minnesota, 218 U.S. 57 (1910) (double damages and fine or imprisonment under state law
held properly imposed upon one making casual and involuntary trespass upon state lands
by cutting timber thereon without a valid permit, even though trespassers honestly believed
authority had been granted and acted upon that belief).
38. 470 A.2d at 1347 See Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957).
39. 470 A.2d at 1347. See Commonwealth v. Koczwara, 397 Pa. 575, 155 A.2d 825
(1959), where the court stated:
In recent decades . . . many states have enacted detailed regulatory provisions in
fields which are essentially non-criminal, e.g., pure food and drug acts, speeding ordinances, building regulations, and child labor, minimum wage and maximum hour legislation. Such statutes are generally enforceable by light penalties, and although violations are labelled crimes, the considerations applicable to them are totally different
from those applicable to true crimes, which involve moral delinquency and which are
punishable by imprisonment or another serious penalty. Such so-called statutory
crimes are in reality an attempt to utilize the machinery of criminal administration as
an enforcing arm for social regulations of a purely civil nature, with the punishment
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concluded, therefore, that the order of the Court of Common Pleas
must be reversed.'0
Justice Zappala, concurring, simply asserted that the statute was
reasonably and rationally related to a legitimate state objective
and did not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. 41
In his opinion, discretionary determinations by law enforcement
officers v ere precluded.' 2
Justice Zappala went on to state that an impermissibly vague
statute must fail to define an offense in such a way that ordinary
people cannot understand what conduct is proscribed.' 3 He distin-

guished the appellee's argument, noting that it focused on Mikulan's own inability to determine when his conduct violated section
3731(a)(4), not that the statute itself was vague.4" But, Justice
Zappala concluded, a mere showing of difficulty in determining
whether conduct is proscribed did not meet the heavy burden of
upon one challenging the constitutionality of a
persuasion imposed
5
legislative act.'

Approving the majority's rejection of the appellee's alternative
argument-that imposing strict criminal liability violates due prototally unrelated to questions of moral wrongdoing or guilt. It is here that the social
interest in the general well-being and the security of the populace has been held to
outweigh the individual interest of the particular defendant. The penalty is imposed
despite the the defendant's lack of a criminal intent or mens rea. . . .Not the least
of the legitimate police powers of the legislature is the control of intoxicating liquor.
Id. at 580, 155 A.2d at 827-28.
However, it can be argued that the problem of the drunk driver does represent "moral
wrongdoing," or mala in se, and because of the imprisonment a defendant faces upon conviction, that § 3731(a)(4) should not be considered merely regulatory and non-criminal, or
malum prohibitum.
40. 470 A.2d at 1348.
41. Id. (Zappala, J., concurring).
42. Id.
43. Id. Justice Zappala thus introduces a third element, a nexus requirement, into the
Kolender test for vagueness. In this context, the "nexus" is the relationship between the'
wording of the statute and the inability of the accused to ascertain its meaning.
Under the facts of Kolender, 103 S. Ct. 1855 (1983), introducing this nexus element,
which is normally part of an overbreadth test, was appropriate. An individual was arrested
and convicted for violating a California loitering statute requiring persons who loiter or
wander the streets to provide "credible and reliable'I information. While there may have
been a "chilling effect" upon the constitutionally protected freedom of movement and association, both of which may have been infringed by the! statute, the Kolender Court held the
statute unconstitutionally vague because it failed to clarify what was required by the phrase
"credible and reliable," and therefore violated the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. 103 S. Ct. at 1856.
44. 470 A.2d 1349.
45. Id. See Snider v. Thornburgh, 496 Pa. 159, 436 A.2d 593 (1981). See supra note 8.
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cess 4 -Justice Zappala proposed the test fbr imposing strict criminal liability outlined by Judge (now Justice) Blackmun in Holdridge v. United States.7 Since section 3731(a)(4) met the
standards of that test, Justice Zappala concurred in the result.48
Chief Justice Roberts also concurred, adding that the scienter
requirement for imposing criminal liability is met because section
3731(a)(4) sanctions only those who choose to drive after knowingly consuming alcoholic beverages.4 9 Therefore, relying on Commonwealth v. Field,50 he felt that the majority's discussion of
whether absolute liability may be constitutionally imposed was
inappropriate. 51
Justice Nix concurred, asserting that a driver with a BAC of
0.10% is necessarily aware of some degree of impairment.2
Agreeing "that the imposition of absolute liability" was "permissible in the case" at bar, Justice McDermott joined in the decision
to reverse. 53 In addition, he found the majority's discussion of culpability in cases involving sentences of ninety days or more was
premature because appellee was not subject to the minimum imprisonment of ninety days imposed by section 3731(e)(1)(iii) for
second offenders.5 4
Justice Hutchinson, concurring, agreed that section 3731(a)(4)
was "not void for vagueness under the due process clause of the
46. 470 A.2d at 1349.
47. 282 F.2d 302 (8th Cir. 1960). Judge Blackmun concluded that:
[WIhere it seems to involve what is basically a matter of policy, where the standard
imposed is, under the circumstances, reasonable, and adherence thereto [is] properly
expected of a person, where the penalty is relatively small, where conviction does not
gravely besmirch, where the statutory crime is not one taken over from the common
law, and where the [legislative] purpose is supporting, the statute can be construed as
one not requiring criminal intent.
Id. at 310.
48. 470 A.2d at 1349.
49. Id. at 1350 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
50. 490 Pa. 519, 417 A.2d 160 (1980) (statute providing that a person who unintentionally causes death of another while engaged in a traffic violation is guilty of homicide by
vehicle, a second degree misdemeanor, held not to be unconstitutionally vague. Because
statute required proof that actor's conduct caused death, successful constitutional challenge
on ground that violation would impose prison term in absence of culpable conduct was
precluded).
51. 470 A.2d at 1350.
52. Id. (Nix, J., concurring). This awareness might satisfy the mens rea requirement as
defined in 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 305(b)(2), under which negligence will constitute sufficient culpability. See supra note 35.
53. 470 A.2d at 1350 (McDermott, J., concurring).
54. Id. See 75 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 3731(e)(1)(iii) (Purdon 1977).
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fourteenth amendment." 55 However, he found Justice Larsen's and
Chief Justice Roberts' respective solutions of the scienter problem
to be unworkable.5 6 He claimed that the Chief Justice's merging of
the element of intent into the act of alcohol consumption was "unconstitutional for offenses graded as second degree misdemeanors," 7 and that Justice Larsen's solution would defeat the legislative intent to impose the sanction of a second degree misdemeanor
"by converting most prosecutions into summary offenses." 5 8
Justice Hutchinson therefore concluded that it was inappropriate to label this a summary offense and bring it within statutorily
delineated exceptions to the requirements of culpability.5 9 In his
opinion, the appropriate solution is to define the consumption of
alcoholic beverages necessary to produce a BAC of 0.10% or
greater as being grossly negligent, thus permitting the grading of a
section 3731(a)(4) violation as a misdemeanor.8 0
In his dissent, Justice Flaherty agreed with the legislative purpose of removing drunk drivers from the road but nevertheless
found section 3731(a)(4) to be unconstitutionally vague.6 ' He felt
the provision failed to give any meaningful notice of what behavior
was proscribed because it prohibited the operation of motor vehicle after ingesting an amount of alcohol which the ordinary person
cannot measure.8 For this reason, he concluded the statute could
not satisfy the notice requirements under the void-for-vagueness
doctrine.
As the Mikulan court pointed out, it is beyond dispute that re55. 470 A.2d at 1350 (Hutchinson, J., concurring and dissenting).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. Justice Hutchinson believed that there had been no clear expression of legislative intent to impose absolute liability, and citing Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246
(1952), stated that the mere omission of a scienter requirement in a criminal statute should
not "be construed as dispensing with it." 470 A.2d at 1352. See State v. Great Atlantic &
Pacific Tea Co. of America, 111 W. Va. 148, 161 S.E. 5 (1931) (mens rea will be presumed
required in the absence of contrary legislative intent clearly expressed). Cf. Halstad v. State,
41 N.J.L. 552, 596, 32 Am. Rep. 247 (1897), limited in State v. Labato, 7 N.J. 137, 80 A.2d
617, 623 (1951) (under statute providing that any person having papers pertaining to numbers game in his possession shall be adjudged a disorderly person, knowing possession as
distinguished from knowledge of illegal character of subject matter is equally an element of
the offense).
59. 470 A.2d at 1352 (Hutchinson, J., concurring and dissenting). See 18 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 305 (Purdon 1984).
60. 470 A.2d at 1352 (Hutchinson, J., concurring and dissenting) (citing 18 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 302(b)(4) (Purdon 1984)).
61. 470 A.2d at 1352 (Flaherty, J., dissenting).
62. Id.
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moving drunk drivers from the highways is a legitimate state objective of paramount importance.6 3 Highway safety laws and regulation of the consumption of alcohol derive their validity from the
broadest of police powers." But the compelling nature of the state
interest and the breadth of the police power do not enable legislative enactments to violate either the provisions or the spirit of the
Constitution of the United States. In dealing with constitutional
challenges to statutes similar to section 3731(a)(4), state supreme
courts are applying their own gloss to the interpretation of the federal constitution. Across the span of 165 years, Chief Justice Marshall's famous statement still rings true: "We must never forget
that it is a constitution we are expounding."6 5 The supreme court
of a state must follow the rulings of the United States Supreme
Court as to the meaning of the federal constitution, but it may
interpret state laws in any way that does not violate principles of
federal law.66
The void-for-vagueness doctrine had its roots in the era of substantive due process. During this period, the doctrine was exclusively advanced in cases challenging regulatory or economic legislation. 67 The United States Supreme Court at an early point
expressed its concern for minimal guidelines:
It would certainly be dangerous if the legislature could set a net large
enough to catch all possible offenders and leave it to the courts to step inside and say who could be rightfully detained and who should be set at
large. This would, to some extent, substitute the judicial for the legislative
department of the government.0

Competing considerations confound the doctrine. On one hand,
63. Id. at 1342. See Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1 (1979), where Chief Justice Burger noted that of 50,000 traffic fatalities per year in the United States, approximately onehalf are alcohol related. Id. at 17-18 n.9.
64. 470 A.2d at 1340. See South Dakota v. Neville, 103 S.Ct. 916 (1983)."
65. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 407 (1819) (emphasis added).
66. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (The Supremacy Clause). See also J. NOWAK, R. RoTUNDA,

67.

& J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Part I, ch. 1, § 111 p. 20 (1983).
See, e.g., Champlin Ref. Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 286 U.S. 210 (1932); Cline v.

Frink Dairy Co., 274 U.S. 445 (1927); Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926);
United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81 (1921). An early example of an unconstitutionally vague statute is found in International Harvester v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 216
(1914), in which the Court unanimously overturned the conviction of a corporate defendant
for having entered into an agreement to control the price of the harvesters and later selling
them for more than their "real value." Justice Holmes stated that to determine "real
value"-defined as "market value under fair competition, and under normal market conditions"-was a "problem that no human ingenuity could solve." 234 U.S. at 221-23.
68. United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 563, 566 (1875).
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"it will not do to hold an average man to the peril of an indictment
for the unwise exercise of his economic or business knowledge involving so many factors of varying effect that neither the person to
decide in advance nor the jury to try him after the fact can safely
and certainly judge the result." 9 On the other hand, Justice
Holmes' observation remains uncontroverted that "the law is full
of instances where a man's fate depends upon his estimating
rightly, that is, as the jury subsequently estimates it, some matter
of degree. '70 Traditional notions of fair play are implicated. 71 The
crime and its elements "must be so clearly expressed that the ordinary person can intelligently choose, in advance, what course it is
lawful for him to pursue. "72 As noted in Champlin Refining Co. v.
Commission73 "[iut is not the penalty itself that is invalid but the
exaction of obedience to a rule or standard that is so vague and
' 74
indefinite as to really be no rule or standard at all."
The constitutional underpinnings of the doctrine are somewhat
69. Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 U.S. 445, 465 (1927). Cline held unconstitutional a
statute that outlawed certain agreements and associations in restraint of trade, excepting
those whose object was to market at "a reasonable profit" products which could not otherwise be marketed. "Reasonable profit" was held to be an impractical standard for use in a
jury deliberation. Id.
70. Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373, 377 (1913). Nash sustained the "rule of reason" as a sufficiently definite criminal standard under the Sherman Antitrust Act § 1, 15
U.S.C. § 1 (1958). Id. at 377. Cf. United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81 (1921),
in which the Court found the Lever Act, a World War I profiteering statute reenacted in
1919, which penalized hoarding, restricting supply, distribution or production, or charging
excessive prices for, necessities, was unconstitutionally uncertain. The vague provision made
it unlawful to willingly make any unjust or unreasonable rate or charge in handling or dealing with any necessaries.
71. See Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926), where a statute requiring
a contractor to pay his employees "not less than the current rate of per diem wages in the
locality where the work is performed" was held to be so uncertain as to deprive contractors
of their property without due process of law. Id. at 388, 395. Justice Sutherland provided
this frequently quoted principle:
That the terms of a penal statute creating a new offense must be sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render
them liable to its penalties, is a well-recognized requirement, consonant alike with
ordinary notions of fair play ....
[A] statute which either forbids or requires the
doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily
guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due
process of law.
Id. at 391.
72. Id. at 393 (citing United States v. Capital Traction Co., 34 D.C. App. 592, 19 Ann.
Cas. 68 (1910)).
73. 286 U.S. 210 (1932).
74. Id. at 243. The questioned provision penalized the wasteful production of crude oil
or petroleum. It was the use of the term "waste", which depends for its definition upon
many factors subject to frequent change, that rendered the provision indefinite. Id. at 243.
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obscure. Courts have occasionally attributed the vagueness doctrine to the sixth amendment's command that a criminal accused
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation.7 8 This, however, is questionable because state criminal convictions have been
reversed on void-for-vagueness grounds despite very specific indictments.78 In any event, the vagueness doctrine, while having its
roots in substantive due process, has been considered part and parcel with the "overbreadth" doctrine, which invalidates legislation
that proscribes some conduct in such an overbroad manner as to
also infringe upon constitutionally protected conduct. During the
reign of substantive due process, vagueness contentions in first
amendment cases received cursory treatment at best. 77 Since renunciation of substantive due process by the Supreme Court, however, and increased protection of first amendment liberties, free
speech cases have proliferated.7 8
The first of three major causes on this point is Stromberg v. California, 9 in which the Supreme Court held that "[a] statute which
upon its face, and as authoritatively construed [by the state supreme court], is so vague and indefinite as to permit the punishment of [free political discussion] is repugnant to the guarantee of
liberty contained in the Fourteenth Amendment."8 0 Next, in
Herndon v. Lowry, 81 the Supreme Court invalidated a state insurrection statute for a similar reason.82 Finally, Winters v. New
75. See Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 271 U.S. 500, 518 (1926); United States v. L. Cohen
Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81, 89 (1921).
76. See, e.g., Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939).
77. See, e.g., Fox v. Washington, 236 U.S. 273 (1915), considered overruled by Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of Univ. of N.Y., 360 U.S. 684 (1959) (per curiam). See
also Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 236 U.S. 230 (1915), since overruled by Superior Films Inc. v. Dept. of Education, 346 U.S. 495 (1954) (per curiam).
78. See, e.g., Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v.
Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948).
In Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959), Justice Brennan explained:
[T]his Court has intimated that stricter standards of permissible statutory vagueness
may be applied to a statute having a potentially inhibiting effect on speech; a man
may the less be required to act at his peril here, because the free dissemination of
ideas may be the loser.
Id. at 151.
79. 283 U.S. 359 (1931). A California statute made it criminal to display a red flag or
symbol "of opposition to organized government," as a stimulus or invitation to anarchy, or
as an aid to seditious propaganda. Id. at 361. The Court found this proscription unconstitutional. Id. at 369.
80. Id.
81. 301 U.S. 242 (1937).
82. The statute defined insurrection as "any combined resistance to the lawful authority of the State, with intent to the denial thereof, when the same is manifested or intended
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York s8 invalidated a statute because, on its face, it proscribed constitutionally protected conduct.8 4 However, it is important to distinguish these cases from the procedural due process cases because
these three cases were concerned with broad or sweeping statutory
language that reached constitutionally protected conduct. Procedural due process questions, if present at all, were subordinate.8 5
The reason for the distinction was explained in Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside.s6 The tolerable degree of vagueness depends upon the nature of the enactment. Economic regulation is
subject to a less strict vagueness test than statutes purporting to
regulate speech or assembly because the subject matter is often
narrower. The United States Constitution requires substantially
more clarity where the statute infringes upon a constitutionally
protected right and a more stringent vagueness test is applied.87 In
a facial challenge to a statute on overbreadth and vagueness
grounds, a court must first determine whether the enactment
reaches a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct.
If it does not, the overbreadth challenge must fail. The court
should then consider the facial vagueness challenge, and, according
to Flipside, invalidate the statute only if the statute "is impermisto be manifested by acts of violence." The Court overturned a conviction for soliciting members for the Communist party, conducting party meetings, and possessing party literature.
Under the "clear and present danger" test, as understood at the time, the statute as construed and applied was a prior restraint upon speech and other activity protected under the
first and fourteenth amendments. Justice Roberts said, "No reasonably ascertainable standard of guilt is prescribed. So vague and indeterminate are the boundaries thus set to the
freedom of speech and assembly that the law necessarily violates the guarantees of liberty
embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 262-64.
83. 333 U.S. 507 (1948).
84. The state statute made it criminal to possess with intent to sell a publication
"principally made up of criminal news, police reports, or accounts of criminal deeds, or pictures, or stories of deeds of bloodshed, lust or crime." Because the defendant was charged
with possession of obscene magazines with intent to sell, the New York Court of Appeals
felt the publications were clearly within the statute's coverage and it was unnecessary to
discuss the overbreadth issue. The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that the
statute violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment because on its face it
covered "detective stories, treatises on crime, reports of the battle coverage." Id.
85. Collings, Unconstitutional Uncertainty: An Appraisal, 40 CORNELL L.Q. 195, 218
(1955).
86. 455 U.S. 489 (1982). The Court upheld an ordinance regulating the sale of drug
paraphernalia that required a business to obtain a license if it sells any items designed or
marketed for use with illegal cannabis or drugs. The ordinance was deemed not to be overbroad because it only regulated the commercial marketing of items that the labels reveal
may be used for an illicit purpose. Therefore, the statute did not embrace non-commercial
speech, and was not unconstitutionally overbroad. Id.
87. Id. at 499.
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sibly vague in all of its applications. ' 88 Various state courts have
reached inconsistent conclusions regarding this last issue, some in
accord with Flipside,89 others holding that where the language embraces not only acts properly and legally punishable, but acts
which cannot be punished, it will be declared void for
uncertainty.9 0
The vagueness doctrine continued to develop as concern for protection of civil liberties increased. The modern doctrine was first
announced in Papachristouv. City of Jacksonville,9 1 which invalidated a municipal vagrancy ordinance for vagueness because it
failed to give fair notice to a person of ordinary intelligence that
his contemplated conduct was proscribed, and because it encouraged arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions. Similar
standards were considered in Grayned v. City of Rockford.2 But in
Grayned, the Supreme Court upheld local ordinances prohibiting
"noise or diversion" near a school in session because "[a]lthough
the prohibited quantum of disturbance is not specified . . . the
measure is whether normal school activity has been or is about to
be disrupted. . . . Given this 'particular context', the ordinance
gives 'fair notice to those to whom it directed'. 9 3 The Court added
88. Id. at 495. However, the concern for stricter standards where a statute imposes
criminal penalties, see Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948), has led to the invalidation
of criminal statutes even though they could conceivably have some valid application. See,
e.g., Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 394-401 (1979); Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451
(1939). "In the field of regulatory statutes governing business activities, where the acts limited are in a narrow category, greater leeway is allowed." Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972).
89. See, e.g., State ex rel. Forcheimer v. LeBlond, 108 Ohio St. 41, 140 N.E. 491 (1923)
(stating that otherwise valid legislation will not be declared void as unintelligible and meaningless unless so imperfect as to be impossible to execute and enforce). Compare State v.
Dvoracek, 140 Iowa 266, 118 N.W.399 (1908) (legislation cannot be set aside for indefiniteness if there is any reasonable construction that will support it).
90. See, e.g., State v. Diamond, 27 N.M. 477, 202 P. 988 (1921); People v. Briggs, 193
N.Y. 457, 86 N.E. 522 (1908) (if a statute is doubtful and uncertain, or is such that it is
difficult or impossible to comply with its provisions, it will be held to be of no force and
effect). But cf. United States v. Ragen, 314 U.S. 513 (1942), in which the Court, upholding
an income tax evasion conviction for deducting more than "reasonable" allowance for salaries, noted that "tt]he mere fact that a penal statute is so framed as to require a jury upon
occasion to determine a question of reasonableness is not sufficient to make it too vague to
afford a practical guide to permissible conduct." Id. at 523.
91. 405 U.S. 156 (1972). See Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939) ("All are
entitled to be informed as to what the State commands or forbids."). See also Cline v. Frink
Dairy Co., 274 U.S. 445 (1927); United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81 (1921).
92. 408 U.S. 104 (1972) (laws must give a person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable
opportunity to know what is prohibited. To avoid arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement,
laws must provide explicit standards for those who apply them.).
93. 408 U.S. at 110, 112. Note that "this 'particular context'" mentioned in Grayned
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that the words were marked by "flexibility and reasonable breadth,
rather than meticulous specificity."9"
In Mikulan, Justice Larsen relied upon the derivative of these
tests found in Kolender v. Lawson." "As generally stated, the
void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the
criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people
can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that
does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.""
Justice Larsen correctly stated the vagueness test, but in misguided reliance on Kolender may have misinterpreted the spirit, if
not the letter of the test, by focusing his analysis on the arbitrary
and discriminatory enforcement element of the test while summarily dismissing appellee's argument-that the statute provided insufficient notice and definition-as overly technical and a misperception of the vagueness doctrine. The Kolender test is a two
part test, and a statute may be invalidated for failing to satisfy
either part.
While section 3731(a)(4) purports to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement by imposing standards which, once exceeded, preclude further discretion by the police or the courts, and
thus survives at least a facial challenge on that ground, the other
aspect of the test presents a thornier problem. The test may be
easily applied when conduct is totally prohibited, but not when a
statute proscribes conduct quantitatively 9" rather than absolutely.

In other words, it is a far simpler matter for an ordinary person to
recognize that a certain act is prohibited in toto, no matter what
quantum of act is performed, but it is virtually impossible for him
to ascertain that his consumption of alcohol prior to driving, which
was lawful up to the point at which he finished his last drink (or
even, technically, a portion thereof), is now proscribed because his
involved an easily determinable subjective standard, that is, a loud noise is quite likely to be
disturbing. Compare this with an obscure objective standard unascertainable by an ordinary
individual-the breathalyzer statute which imposes liability for a BAC of 0.10% or greater.
Furthermore, the Grayned court may have upheld the ordinance because it required only
demonstrated interference with school activities, wilfully done, to be proscribed and punishable. Id. at 114.
94. Id. at 110 (citing Esteban v. Central Missouri State College, 415 F.2d 1077, 1088
(8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 965 (1970)).
95. 103 S.Ct. 1855 (1983).
96. Id. at 1858. While the vagueness doctrine concerns both notice to citizens and
standards for enforcement, the Kolender Court found that the latter was the more important consideration. Id. (citing Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 574 (1974)).
97. 470 A.2d at 1342-43.
98. See Grayned, 408 U.S. 104, 112. See also supra note 91.

1276

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 23:1261

BAC is elevated to more than 0.10%. The risk of misjudgment of
the lawfulness of another drink is great, particularly since it has
been recognized that most individuals feel varying degrees of impairment (a subjective standard) at BAC's of the same value. 9
This means individuals do not possess the benefit of a reasonable
subjective standard like that found lawful in Grayned.1 00
Justice Zappala's response to this argument was that the law is
replete with instances in which the legislature has rightly made an
individual bear the risk of his own misjudgment. His reliance upon
a statutory rape case in support of his conclusion, however, is reasoning by false analogy. In Commonwealth v. Robinson, the imposition of liability for a wrong, and perhaps even justifiable guess
that a certain woman was of the age of consent was held constitutional10 1 because of the compelling state interest in protecting
under-age females from their own misjudgment, 102 and because
sexual intercourse between such females and males of majority age
is always proscribed. However, section 3731(a)(4) allows an individual to drink and drive so long as he is not impaired within the
meaning of section 3731(a)(1), and his BAC is below 0.10%. Relying upon the "wrong guess doctrine" applied in statutory rape
cases to support the conclusion that absolute liability for section
3731 violations is permissible is thus misleading.
Requiring one to guess about the lawfulness of one's conduct effectively precludes an individual from using the statutory standard
(BAC of 0.10% or greater) to guide his conduct. 10 That section
3731(a)(4) is clear and unambiguous on its face, and that it attempts to foreclose discretionary determinations by law enforcement officers does not remedy this defect. A hole is left in the
Kolender test by this statute because a person still cannot determine the legality of his own conduct by reference to the statutory
standard. That appellee's argument focuses on his own inability to
determine the lawfulness of his contemplated conduct is not reason
99. See, e.g., State v. Franco, 96 Wash. 2d 816, 639 P.2d 1320, 1323 (1982).
100. See also United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 563 (1875); Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274
U.S. 445 (1927). See supra notes 67-68.
101. 470 A.2d at 1349 n.1 (citing Commonwealth v. Robinson, 497 Pa. 49, 438 A.2d 964
(1981)). In Robinson the dissent would allow the defense of reasonable mistake as to the
victim's age based upon the victim's own misrepresentation to the defendant. Id. at 967
(Kaufmann, J., dissenting). See also United States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87, 93 (1975).
102. 497 Pa. at 54, 438 A.2d at 966.
103. See Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 286 U.S. 210 (1932), where a
statutory provision was found repugnant to principles of due process because it provided a
standard "so vague and indefinite as to be really no rule or standard at all." Id. at 243.
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for dismissing his vagueness challenge. 10 4 In fact, this individual
inability to determine that prospective conduct is proscribed is required in order to demonstrate vagueness.10 5 A legislative act creating a statutory offense should define the conduct constituting that
offense with such certainty that a person may determine whether
he has violated the law at the time he does the act charged to be a
violation of law. 0 6
Mikulan also argued that section 3731(a)(4) was invalid for failing to incorporate a mens rea requirement. 10 7 This argument flows
logically from the premise that one cannot intend a criminal act if
one has no notice that the contemplated conduct is prohibited. Because the Court answered this challenge by determining that the
statute imposed absolute liability, it is appropriate to examine the
mens rea requirements for criminal statutes.
Significant disregard of the mens rea requirement is found in
essentially regulatory penal law, where conduct is malum prohibitum (evil because it is prohibited) as opposed to malum in se (evil
by its nature). Born during the industrial revolution, this body of
law regulated the welfare of minors, tobacco, liquor, gaming and
adulterated food. Because of the gravity of the abuses sought to be
controlled, both public sentiment and political opinion leaned toward the protection of society at large, often at the expense of individual freedom. 10 8 An early example is found in State v. Cain,0 9
in which the court concluded that insofar as a statute forbidding
the sale of intoxicating liquors to minors was concerned," 0 a
seller's knowledge or lack thereof of the age of a patron was immaterial to his guilt."' The Cain court justified its reasoning by
104. 470 A.2d at 1343. See supra note 28.
105. A plaintiff engaging in clearly proscribed conduct cannot complain of vagueness
of the law as applied to the conduct of others. Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, 455
U.S. at 495. Compare Coates v. Cincinatti, 402 U.S. 611 (1971), holding that in order to
sustain a vagueness challenge, the complaint must prove that the enactment is vague not in
that it requires conforming one's conduct to an imprecise but comprehensive standard, but
rather that no standard of conduct is specified at all. Id. at 614. But cf. Parker v. Levy, 417
U.S. 733 (1974), stating that "[o]ne to whose conduct a statute clearly applies may not successfully challenge it for vagueness." Id. at 756.
106. State v. Lantz, 90 W. Va. 738, 111 S.E. 766 (1922). See infra text accompanying
notes 146-48.
107. 470 A.2d at 1345.
108. For an excellent treatise on this development, see Mueller, Mens Rea and the
Law Without It, 58 W. VA. L. REv. 34 (1955).
109. 9 W. Va. 559 (1876).
110. W. VA. CODE c. 32, § 12 (1868); 1872-73 W. Va. Acts c. 99, § 3.
111. 9 W. Va. at 571. The court declared that if the legislature had intended that
knowledge be an element of a crime, it would have said so. Furthermore, if it had required
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pointing out that the legislature had proclaimed the statute to be
remedial rather than penal;I" 2 therefore a liberal construction was
warranted so as to effectuate the statute's underlying purpose. " 3
Several Massachusetts cases support the proposition that legislative silence on mens rea in remedial or regulatory legislation is
tantamount to absolute criminal liability for the mere actus
11 5
reus.'1 ' The Supreme Court, in Shevlin-Carpenterv. Minnesota,
advanced the idea that the legislature may dispense with the requisite knowledge even where a written constitution prescribes due
process requirements in all criminal prosecutions,11 6 and public
policy or achievement of a social goal may be sufficient justifications for eliminating a mens rea requirement from the definition of
a crime in a statute.1 1 7 United States v. Balint'1 8 further developed this principle by holding that the legislature may well consider the defendant's intent or knowledge immaterial, particularly
where those acts proscribed cause the same evil irrespective of
knowledge or intent. " 9
Another reason for allowing the imposition of liability without
fault was enunciated in Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. Co. v. United
knowledge as an element, it would have "failed in a great degree to accomplish its manifest
object." Id. at 576.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Farren, 91 Mass. (9 Allen) 489 (1864) (imposing absolute liability for keeping for sale or selling of adulterated milk). Accord: Commonwealth v.
Waite, 93 Mass. (11 Allen) 264 (1865). Compare Commonwealth v. Smith, 103 Mass. 444
(1869) (decided after the statute was rewritten to expressly require knowledge of the adulterations, and expressing that court's belief that the Farrenand Waite cases imposed not
absolute liability, but liability for criminal carelessness). See also Commonwealth v. Boynton, 84 Mass. (2 Allen) 160 (1861) (imposing liability for sale of intoxicating liquor even if
the seller was unaware of its intoxicating quality).
115. 218 U.S. 57 (1910).
116. Id. at 67-68.
117. Id. at 69-70. The state may, to advance public policy, provide that "he who shall
do [these acts] shall do them at his peril and will not be heard to plead in defense good faith
and ignorance." Id. at 70. This is particularly true where the statute emphasizes the
achievement of a social goal rather than the punishment of crimes that are mala in se. See
Commonwealth v. Mixer, 207 Mass. 141, 93 N.E. 249 (1910) (upholding conviction of common carrier for unknowingly transporting unmarked alcoholic beverage without a permit).
118. 258 U.S. 250 (1922).
119. In Balint, the manifest purpose of a statute regulating narcotics was to bring
dealers of dangerous drugs under the close supervision of government taxing officers. It employed a criminal penalty to secure recorded evidence of the distribution of drugs and to
restrain traffic. Every dealer had to ascertain at his own peril whether that which he sold
was within the statute's coverage. If he sold it in ignorance of its proscribed or prohibited
character, he would be penalized.

1985

Recent Decisions

1279

States,120 where the Court found it permissible for the legislature
to shift the burden of loss from victims to those who could measurably control the causes of that loss. 2 '
The principal mens rea case discussed in the Mikulan opinion is
Lambert v. California,12 2 and the faulty analysis Justice Larsen applies to it are worth noting. On its face, Lambert implies a position
contrary to that inferred by the Mikulan court.123 In Lambert, the
issue presented was whether "this libertine democracy of ours
[will] continue to permit the conviction of persons who justifiably
had no notion of wrongdoing when they conducted themselves in
violation of law?' 24 A mens rea requirement is the key to preventing conviction of persons who have no notion of wrongdoing when
they violate the law.
But just how much blameworthy intent is necessary under culpability requirements? If some kind of intent is required, what
kind is it? Four principle types of mens rea have been identified: 2 5
(1) commensurate, in which there is an evil intent to do precisely
that which constitutes the prohibited harm such as the intent to
kill a human being; 26 (2) additional,which demands more than an
evil intent to do the prohibited harm, such as a particularly evil
thought, disposition, or premeditation of murder;2 7 (3) adequate,
120. 220 U.S. 559 (1911).
121. Id. at 575. The statute in question required the use of automatic couplers and
specified drawbars on all railroad cars used in interstate commerce.
122. 355 U.S. 225 (1957).
123. The Mikulan court maintained that Lambert stood for the proposition that there
is wide latitude on the part of lawmakers to exclude elements of knowledge from the definition of an offense. See 355 U.S. at 228. While Lambert did say this, it held that in the case
of an ordinance requiring registration by felons, knowledge of the duty to register is required before conviction for failure to register is allowed. Id. at 229. The Lambert Court,
furthermore, concluded that because the offense consisted of a mere failure to register, conduct wholly passive, it was unlike the commission of acts or the failure to act under the
circumstances that should alert the actor to the consequences of his deed. Id. What Lambert effectively stood for is the prohibition of punishment of passive criminal conduct without a mens rea requirement. Additionally, California law requires a joint operation of act
and intent or criminal negligence in every crime or criminal offense. See CAL. PENAL CODE
ANN. § 20 (West 1954).
124. Mueller, On Common Law Mens Rea, 42 MINN. L. REv. 1043, 1044 (1957). Amicus
curiae phrased the moral question in terms of law: "Does conviction under the ordinance in
the absence of wrongful intent violate due process of law?" Id.
125. Id. at 1056-65.
126. Id. at 1056-57. The mens rea is commensurate with the actus reus; the culpability coincides with the bad act.
127. Id. at 1061-62. This is a higher standard than commensurate. That is, a closer
correlation between blameworthy or immoral intent and actus reus (bad act) is required to
satisfy this culpability requirement. The intent required under this standard is a more reprehensible intent than under the type of mens rea known as commensurate. This incorpo-
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defined as "an attitude of self-centered thoughtlessness and disregard for the rights of others despite the capacity and opportunity
to realize and respect these rights," such as negligence or recklessness; 128 and (4) independent, in which an inoffensive act is made
unlawful because of its recognized misuse for socially harmful purposes by persons with
evil intentions of a different, independent,
1 29
and particular sort.

Yet it can be said that intent is part of every "act". Intent is the
mental process of determining to engage in a certain act, or according to Webster, the state of mind with which an act is done.130 In
United States v. Gris,'3 ' the court concluded that the defendant
charged with wiretapping "knew exactly what he was doing; and
what he did was a violation of the Federal Communications Act.
He intended to do what he did, and that is sufficient [to impose
criminal liability].' ' 2 Such statements confuse the mens rea requirement with the mental process component of doing an act.
"Actually, mens rea is an awareness of evil, the sense of doing
something which one ought not, which constitutes the crux or sub1 33
stance of mens rea at common law.'
Because section 3731(a)(4) is silent as to a mens rea requirement, Justice Larsen had to determine the legislative intent behind the statute. 3 4 To do so, he turned to a different statute,
namely the general culpability requirements of the Pennsylvania
Crimes Code. 135 While it is true that the Crimes Code excludes
rates the idea of malum in se, that certain types of intent, i.e., premeditation, are bad in
and of themselves because harm is intended. Id.
128. Id. at 1063. This is a lower standard than commensurate, used to facilitate the
administration of justice. It is not an intent to do harm, but a disregard for the potentiality
of harm arising from one's own actions that is punishable under this standard.
129. Id. at 1064. For example, it is permissible for a gentleman to offer a ride to a lady
from State A to State B unless "for the purpose of prostitution or debauchery or for any
other immoral purpose." The Mann Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2421 (1952). Example provided by
Mueller, supra note 121, at 1064-65.

130.

WEBSTER'S SEVENTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY

(1971).

131. 247 F.2d 860 (2d Cir. 1957).
132. Id. at 864.
133. Mueller, supra note 121, at 1060. Similarly, in the case of statutory additions to
the common law, it may be the mere awareness of unlawfulness which provides the requisite
mens rea. Id.
134. See, e.g., Hunt v. State, 195 Ind. 585, 146 N.E. 329 (1925), in which the court
stated that it would not void a legislative enactment because the language used is indefinite
as to some particular, if the legislative intent can be ascertained. The court went on to state
that legislative intent is the essence of the law, and the role of the court in construing legislative enactments is to divine that intent. Id.
135. 470 A.2d at 1347. See supra note 35.
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knowledge that the contemplated conduct is proscribed as an element of an offense, 3 6 it is questionable whether the general culpability requirements of the crimes code are properly applicable.
This is because these culpability requirements are general; they
cannot be perfectly suited to cover all situations arising in which a
given statute fails to mention a culpability requirement. In this instance, the Mikulan plurality is unflinchingly willing to make a
man liable for his own faulty, possibly impaired judgment. 13 7 But
the impairment of one's own judgment is a voluntary and lawful
act. A different type of mens rea analysis is thus implicated,""5 because it is not until BAC reaches 0.10% or greater that a drinking
driver incurs liability under section 3731(a)(4). If one cannot ascertain that his BAC is at least 0.10%, the argument that liability for
driving while impaired is based upon knowledge of having reached
a proscribed level of impairment, or upon intent to reach the proscribed level, is tenuous at best. The irrational result of such an
argument is to make the culpability for an arguably unintended
but prohibited act depend upon the mens rea involved in and giving rise to a lawful act.
By concluding, as Justice Larsen did, that the legislature intended to impose absolute liability for violations of section
3731(a)(4), those violations are converted from second-degree misdemeanors into summary offenses. 9 While first or second offenses
136. This section reads in relevant part:
Culpability as to illegality of conduct. Neither knowledge nor recklessness or negligence as to whether conduct constitutes an offense or as to the existence, meaning, or
application of the law determining the elements of an offense is an element of such
offense, unless the definition of the offense or this title so provides.
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 302(h) (Purdon 1983).
In other words, when the statute is silent as to criminal mens rea requirements, they are
presumed to have been dispensed with.
137. The effect of impairment upon intent is beyond the scope of this note.
138. The consumption of alcohol is an intentional and lawful act. Because consumption is not proscribed, the mental component of determining to consume alcoholic beverages
may not suffice to establish the requisite culpability. To hold otherwise would be to apply
the principle of United States v. Gris, 247 F.2d 860 (2d Cir. 1957), in an entirely inappropriate circumstance by merging the intent to violate the law into the intent to do the act which
is a violation. This is inappropriate in this case because the intent to drink liquor and subsequently drive a vehicle does not result in a prohibited act until impairment or a BAC of
0.10% or greater results. Otherwise, the act is lawful until those levels are reached. It is not
fair to find the intent necessary to support conviction for an unlawful act in the intent to
commit a lawful act.
139. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 305(b)(1) states that: "when absolute liability is imposed with respect to any material element of an offense defined by a statute other than this
title and a conviction is based upon such liability, the offense constitutes a summary offense." Id.
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are punishable by jail terms of less than ninety days, 14 0 and so fit
within the limitations imposed upon the creation of summary offenses,"" the statute also authorizes penalties of more than"ninety
thus cannot be classified as a sumdays for third offenses, 142 and tu
mary offense.' 4 3 It makes no sense for the court to create a summary offense of section 3731 when the legislature clearly expressed
its intent, on the face of the statute, to impose a criminal
sanction. 144
Alternative resolutions of the mens rea problem are provided by
Chief Justice Roberts' merging of intent into the act of alcohol
consumption itself ' and Justice Hutchinson's view that consumption of alcohol in an amount sufficient to attain a BAC of 0.10% is
itself negligent. 4 The former is truly unworkable because it is not
140. Section 3731(e)(1) establishes the penalties for violations of § 3731(a):
Any person violating any of the provisions of this section is guilty of a misdemeanor
of the second degree and the sentencing court shall order the person to pay a fine of
not less than $300 and serve a minimum term of: (i) not less than 48 consecutive
hours [for first offense]; (ii) not less than 30 days if the person has previously been
convicted of an offense under this section or of an equivalent offense in this or other
jurisdictions within the previous seven years.
75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3731(e)(1)(i) and (ii) (Purdon 1977).
141. A summary offense under the crimes code or another title is an offense wherein a
convicted person may be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not more than 90 days. 18
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 106(c) (Purdon 1983).
142. Section 3731 imposes a penalty of not less than 90 days if the person has twice
previously been convicted of an offense under the section or of an equivalent offense in this
or other jurisdictions within the seven previous years, and not less than one year if the
person has three times been previously convicted of an offense under the section or of an
equivalent offense in this or other jurisdictions within the previous seven years. 75 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 3731(e)(1)(iii) and (iv) (Purdon 1977).
143. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 106(c). See supra note 138.
144. "Any person violating [§ 3731] is guilty of a misdemeanor of the second degree
75 . PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3731(e)(1) (Purdon 1977).
145. "Section 3731(a)(4) ... sanctions only those who have chosen to drive after having knowingly consumed alcoholic beverages." 470 A.2d at 1350. This serves to establish
culpability under 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 302(a) and (c) (Purdon 1983). Section 302(a)
sets forth minimum culpability requirements stating that "[e]xcept as provided in Section
305 of this title. . . a person is not guilty of an offense unless he acted intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, or negligently, as the law may require, with respect to each element of the
offense." Id. Section 302(c) states that "when the culpability sufficient to establish a material element of an offense is not proscribed by law, such element is established if a person
acts intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly with respect thereto." Id.
146. "I have no difficulty in concluding that consumption of alcoholic beverages in
quantities sufficient to produce a blood alcohol level [of 0.10%] is at least grossly negligent
. . . thus permitting the grading of this offense [as] a misdemeanor." 470 A.2d at 1352
(Hutchinson, J., concurring and dissenting). See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 302(b)(4), which
provides that a:
person acts negligently with respect to a material element of an offense when he
should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element ex-
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the consumption of alcohol that section 3731(a)(4) prohibits, but
driving with a certain blood alcohol level. The latter view is in accord with that of Justice Nix, that a person with a BAC of 0.10%
14 7
or greater is necessarily aware of some degree of impairment.
This argument has merit because by defining the act of consuming
alcoholic beverages in an amount sufficient to induce a BAC of
0.10% as negligent, the legislative intent to impose criminal sanctions for violations of section 3731 is preserved and promoted.' 4 8
However, it is the court which is defining the mens rea requirement under these approaches, and not the legislature.
One of the more commendable approaches to imposing absolute
liability without a mens rea requirement is known as the West Virginia Rule, developed in State v. The Great Atlantic and Pacific
Tea Co.' 49 Writing for a unanimous court, Judge Hatcher refused
to apply absolute criminal liability in the absence of a "clearly expressed" legislative intention. 50 Thus the West Virginia Rule is
that while the legislature has the power to dispense with the mens
rea requirement in petty offenses of a regulatory nature, the intention to do so must be clearly expressed, otherwise "the common
law rule will be applied and a general intent to do the prohibited
act with knowledge of all material facts, particularly those that
mark the border between the lawful and the unlawful act will be
required."'5' The common law rule is that there can be no criminal
liability except that based on personal conscious wrongdoing; that
is, there must be a concurrence of evil act (actus reus) and evil
52
mind (mens rea).1
The rule prevailing in most American jurisdictions as to whether
ists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such nature and degree that
the actor's failure to perceive it, considering the nature and intent of his conduct and
the circumstances known to him, involves a gross deviation from the standard of care
that a reasonable person would observe in the actor's situation.
Id.
147. 470 A.2d at 1350 (Nix, J., concurring).
148. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 302(e) (Purdon 1983). "Substitutes for negligence,
recklessness or knowledge.-When the law provides that negligence suffices to establish an
element of an offense, such element also is established if a person acts intentionally or
knowingly." Id.
149. 111 W. Va. 148, 161 S.E. 5 (1931). Defendant was indicted for a short weight sale
by one of its agents contrary to the provisions of the weights and measures statute. The
statute was silent as to mens rea with respect to short weight sales.
150. 111 W. Va. at 149-50, 161 S.E. at 5.
151. See Mueller, supra note 106, for an excellent discussion of this rule.
152. Compare the North Carolina Rule where the mens rea is presumed for all regulatory offenses until the defendant rebuts the presumption. See State v. Welch, 232 N.C. 77,
59 S.E.2d 199 (1950); State v. Elliot, 232 N.C. 377, 61 S.E.2d 93 (1950).
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mens rea is required for regulatory offenses is to construe the statutes so as to divine the legislative intent. This rule was used by the
Mikulan court, in part, and because there are no fixed criteria for
result is a confused treatment
ascertaining legislative intent, the 153
based upon inconsistent decisions.
One reason that it is imperative to resolve this mens rea issue, as
4 is because a scienter
recently recognized in Colautti v. Franklin,15
requirement may mitigate a law's vagueness, especially with respect to the adequacy of notice to the defendant of the conduct
proscribed. 55 This is because knowledge is an element of notice as.
well as of intent. Notice in this context involves knowledge that
one's contemplated conduct is prohibited. Intent involves the
knowing disposition towards committing the act. However, as
pointed out in the dissent in Screws v. United States,1 6 ifa statute is so vague as to be meaningless; it is a non-sequitur to say that
true
guilty knowledge or evil purpose cures the vagueness; "[i]t 5 is
7
bootstraps.'
its
by
up
itself
lift
cannot
it
of a statute that
The mens rea doctrine evolved from the common law as a protection of the unjust conviction of the blameless,1 and is regarded
as a universal requirement for criminal liability. The legislature
certainly has the power to eliminate mens rea requirements from
its statutory criminal definitions; yet, it has not indicated its intention to do so in dealing with drunk drivers, and for the Mikulan
court to find that intent in the general culpability requirements of
the Pennsylvania Crimes Code and impose absolute liability for
section 3731 violations is in derogation of the common law.
For both the vagueness issue and the mens rea requirements, the
Mikulan court sought to ascertain legislative intent, with mixed
and contradictory results. If an enactment is so uncertain that the
court is unable to determine with any reasonable degree of certainty what the legislature intended, it is void for uncertainty. 159
153. See United States v. Combs, 73 F. Supp. 813 (E.D. Ky. 1947); People v. Daniels,
18 Cal. App. 2d 340, 257 P.2d 1038 (1953); Commonwealth v. Babb, 166 Pa. Super. 63, 70
A.2d 660 (1950).
154. 439 U.S. 379 (1979).
155. Id. at 395.
156. 325 U.S. 91 (1945). Justices Roberts, Frankfurter, and Jackson dissented jointly,
recognizing the logical defects of the scienter refinement to the vagueness doctrine. Id. at
138.
157. Id. at 154 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
158. In Lambert, 355 U.S. 225 (1957), the Supreme Court clearly indicated its displeasure with the misuse of the criminal sanction in the case of a morally blameless defendant.
159. Commonwealth v. Mack, 467 Pa. 613, 359 A.2d 770 (1976); Husting v. State Canvassers, 159 Wis. 216, 150 N.W. 542 (1915); Cook v. State, 26 Ind. App. 278, 59 N.E. 489
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Because section 3731(a)(4) provides no rule or standard by
which an ordinary person can determine the lawfulness of his contemplated conduct, or ascertain that he is in violation of the law,
and because there is no mens rea requirement in that statute, it
creates absolute liability for a criminal offense, carrying with it a
possibility of imprisonment. For these reasons, section 3731(a)(4)
needs to be redrafted both in the interest of fairness as well as
advancing the public policy behind it. As one analyst has written,
"The absolute law works toward frustration and apathy since [the]
penalty does not depend on lack of exercise of care, the negligence
law works toward diligence, by excepting the honest and diligent
from punishment."' 6 0
The purpose behind section 3731(a)(4) would be advanced if a
culpability requirement were incorporated. Those who exercised
due care and stopped drinking before they were rendered "incapable" within the meaning of section 3731(a)(1), but were unknowingly in violation of section 3731(a)(4) might be excepted for their
diligence. Alleviating the imposition on diligent persons who seek
to abide by the law would produce a fairer statute more likely to
be obeyed than disregarded.
John J. Winter

(1901).
160. Mueller, supra note 109, at 65. See Commonwealth v. Heinbaugh, 467 Pa. 1, 354
A.2d 244 (1976), holding that "the requirements of due process are satisfied if the statute in
question contains reasonable standards to guide the prospective conduct." Id. at 6, 354 A.2d
at 246.

